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Abstract
While there seems to be a consensus that political parties remain the sine qua non of western
democracies, the question of under which conditions political parties could be dissolved has also
been gaining significance in European human rights law since the 1990s. An overall assessment
of the cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights (”ECtHR”) and domestic courts of
the member of the Council of Europe suggests there are three categories of political parties faced
with the prospect of dissolution. Part I of this Article describes the first category, the political
parties that have criticized state policies on certain sensitive domestic issues, such as the problems
faced by minority groups (”pro-minority political parties”). Part II deals with the second category,
the so-called anti-secular political parties, which have found no support at the ECtHR. Part III
describes the third category, the parties that had proven links with terrorist organizations and, like
anti-secular parties, were not protected by the ECtHR under the Convention.

CRITERIA DEVELOPED BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE
DISSOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Olgun Akbulut*
INTRODUCTION
While there seems to be a consensus that political parties
remain the sine qua non of western democracies, the question of
under which conditions political parties could be dissolved has
also been gaining significance in European human rights law
since the 1990s. Before the 1990s, dissolution of a political party
was known as a Cold-War phenomenon. When the German
Communist Party submitted an application to the European
Commission of Human Rights (“Commission”) in 1957, the
Commission found no difficulty in turning down the application
on the basis of Article 17 (abuse of right of individual petition) of
the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or
“Convention”).1 According to the Commission, the party’s
commitment to social and communist order established by
proletarian revolution and dictatorship placed itself in
contradiction with democratic ideals.2 Similarly, in the case of X.
v. Italy, where the applicant sought protection for a fascist
political movement, the Commission, by referring to the
legitimate aim to protect democracy, found the application
inadmissible.3

* Dr. Akbulut (PhD) is an Assistant Professor of Human Rights and Constitutional
Law at Kadir Has University, Faculty of Law (Istanbul, Turkey).
1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
17, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights].
2. See German Communist Party v. Germany, App. No. 250/57, European
Commission of Human Rights: Documents and Decisions: 1955–1957, 222–25 (Eur.
Comm’n H.R. 1957).
3. See X. v. Italy, App. No. 6741/74, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 83, 83–85
(1976).
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Apart from these two political party applications, European
human rights monitoring has dealt mainly with political speeches
of individual applicants seeking protection under Article 10
ECHR (freedom of expression).4 It has been the common
understanding in Europe that political parties are not prohibited
in democracies; only criminal behaviors of individual members
are punished. Therefore, there has not been a common
European model for the dissolution of political parties.5
However, the 1990s marked another turning point in European
human rights law. For the first time in its history, the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “Court”) had to decide a
case on the dissolution of a political party in United Communist
Party v. Turkey.6 Since then, the Court has dealt with twelve cases
that directly concern the dissolution of political parties.7

4. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 10.
5. See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),
Opinion on the Constitutional and Legal Provisions Relevant to the Prohibition of Political Parties
in Turkey, 4–5, Op. No. 489/2008, CDL-AD(2009)006 [hereinafter Opinion on Turkey].
6. United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998).
7. Herri Batasuna v. Spain, App. Nos. 25803/04 & 25817/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 30,
2009),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=
hbkm&action=html&highlight=25817/04&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en; Fazilet
Partisi v. Turkey (Virtue Party), App. No. 1444/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 27, 2006), available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=
hbkm&action=html&highlight=1444/02&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en; United
Macedonian Org. Ilinden-PIRIN v. Bulgaria, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1119 (2005); Emek
Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 39434/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 31, 2005), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=39434/98&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en;
Democracy
and
Change Party v. Turkey, App. Nos. 39210/98 & 39974/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 26, 2005),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=39974/98&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en; Socialist Party of
Turkey (STP) v. Turkey, App. No. 26482/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 12, 2003), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=26482/95&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en; Refah Partisi v. Turkey
(Welfare Party), 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 269 (2003); Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP)
of Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 25141/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 10, 2002), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=25141/94&sessionid=59747964&skin=hudoc-en; Yazar v. Turkey, 2002II Eur. Ct. H.R. 395 (2002); Freedom and Democracy Party (OZDEP) v. Turkey, 1999VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 293 (1999); United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1 (1998); Socialist Party v. Turkey, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1233 (1998). In nine of
these cases, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “Court”) found a
violation, and in two (Welfare Party and Batasuna v. Spain) the Court found the
dissolution justified. In Virtue Party, the applicants withdrew the case. The ECtHR also
had to deal with refusal of registration to political parties, ban on political party
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An overall assessment of the cases decided by the ECtHR
and domestic courts of the member of the Council of Europe
suggests there are three categories of political parties faced with
the prospect of dissolution. Part I of this Article describes the first
category, the political parties that have criticized state policies on
certain sensitive domestic issues, such as the problems faced by
minority groups (“pro-minority political parties”). Part II deals
with the second category, the so-called anti-secular political
parties, which have found no support at the ECtHR. Part III
describes the third category, the parties that had proven links
with terrorist organizations and, like anti-secular parties, were not
protected by the ECtHR under the Convention.
I.

PRO-MINORITY POLITICAL PARTIES

The first political party case that fits into the category of prominority political parties is United Communist Party v. Turkey.8 The
United Communist Party in Turkey (“UCP”) was formed as a
political party on June 4, 1990.9 Just ten days later, when the UCP
was preparing to participate in general elections, the Chief
Prosecutor of the Republic of Turkey applied to the Turkish
Constitutional Court (“TCC”) for an order dissolving the UCP.10
Among others things, the prosecutor accused the party of having
“carried on activities likely to undermine the territorial integrity
of the [Turkish] State and the unity of the [Turkish] nation.”11
The prosecutor mainly cited a chapter of the party’s program
entitled, “Towards a peaceful, democratic and fair solution for
the Kurdish problem.”12 A year later, the Constitutional Court
ordered the dissolution of the UCP on account of the views
expressed in its program.13
The 1990s marked the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the
emergence of new states and, as a result, new minorities in
activities, and cut of financial support for political parties. These three areas do not fall
under the scope of this Article.
8. United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998).
9. See id. at 7.
10. See id. at 7–8.
11. See id. at 8.
12. See id. at 8–9.
13. See id. at 9–10. Although other grounds were also invoked by the Turkish
Constitutional Court (“TCC”) in this case, it was the aim to protect national and
territorial integrity that provoked the decision for a dissolution. See id.
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Europe. Encouraged by the political discussions in Europe on
better protection of minorities, the UCP referred to Kurds as
“people” and argued against the denial of the rights of, and
discrimination against, Kurds in Turkey, all of which were
thought of as awakening Kurdish national consciousness.14
According to the Turkish Constitutional Court, the party also
encouraged separatism by describing the state authorities’
reaction towards the Kurdish issue as “terror” and by requesting
constitutional recognition of “the existence of the Kurds,” which
were considered illegal activities.15 In its judgment, the ECtHR
noted that the Turkish Constitutional Court had a wellestablished jurisprudence, which holds:
[S]elf-determination and regional autonomy were
prohibited by the Constitution. . . . In Turkey there were no
“minorities” or “national minorities”, other than those
referred to in the Treaty of Lausanne and the friendship
treaty between Turkey and Bulgaria. . . . Like all nationals of
foreign descent, nationals of Kurdish origin could express
their identity, but the Constitution and the law precluded
them from forming a nation or a minority distinct from the
Turkish nation.16

The UCP sued Turkey in Strasbourg upon its dissolution,
asking the ECtHR to declare that the dissolution of the party
violated, among others, Articles 10 (freedom of expression) and
11 (freedom of association) of the ECHR.17
The Turkish government argued in the case that since the
ECHR made no mention of political parties, Article 11 on
14. See id. at 8.
15. See id. at 8–10.
16. Id. at 10. The Lausanne Treaty is a peace treaty signed on July 24, 1923 after the
end of World War I between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania,
and the Serb Croat Slovene State on the one hand and Turkey on the other. Treaty of
Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11. Section III of
the treaty is dedicated to the “protection of minorities.” See id. arts. 37–45. Only nonMuslim minorities were recognized as a minority and provided protection; in practice
this protection only applied to Greek Orthodox, Armenian Christians, and Jews. For
further information on the Treaty of Lausanne and its application in the Turkish legal
system, see Baskın Oran, The Minority Concept and Rights in Turkey: The Lausanne Peace
Treaty and Current Issues, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY 35–56 (Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat
ed., 2007). With the Treaty of Friendship Between Bulgaria and Turkey, both countries
recognized minority rights of each others’ citizens. Treaty of Friendship Between
Bulgaria and Turkey, Protocol A, Oct. 18, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 127.
17. See United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13.
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freedom of association did not apply to political parties.18
According to the government, the case, being an abuse of the
right of individual application, should have been declared
inadmissible under Article 17 of the ECHR.19
The Court dismissed the government’s preliminary
objections and ruled that Article 11 of the ECHR applied to the
present case.20 Article 11 reads: “Everyone has the right to . . .
freedom of association with others, including the right to form
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”21
Based on the fact that political parties are “a form of association
essential to the proper functioning of democracy” and in view of
“the importance of democracy in the Convention system,” the
Court found no doubt that political parties came within the
scope of Article 11.22 Special reference to trade unions in this
formulation, in fact, does not limit the type of association.
Strasbourg organs23 applied Article 17 only in rare cases in
which the aim of the offending actions of the applicants had
been to spread violence or hatred.24 In the present case, the
Court found no implication in the UCP program that the party
encouraged the use of violence or pursued racist objectives.25 In
the Court’s view, political parties cannot be excluded from the
protection afforded by the Convention “simply because [their]
activities are regarded by the national authorities as undermining
the constitutional structures of the State.”26 On the contrary,
state parties are under positive obligation to give effect to the
rights enshrined in the Convention at the domestic level.27
The Court then dealt with the argument of the UCP that the
dissolution of the party even before having had any political
activity infringed the party’s freedom of association.28 It should
be stressed that freedom of association, like freedom of
18. See id. at 14.
19. See id. at 14–16.
20. See id. at 16–17.
21. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, art. 11.
22. See United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17.
23. Strasbourg organs consist of the ECtHR and the now-defunct European
Commission of Human Rights.
24. See United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 37–39.
25. See id. at 38.
26. Id. at 17.
27. See id. at 18.
28. See id. at 18–19.
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expression, is not an absolute right and can be subjected to
limitations listed in Article 11.29 On the other hand, according to
the Court, the limitations set out in Article 11, where political
parties are concerned, are to be construed strictly, and only
“convincing and compelling reasons” may justify restrictions on
the freedom of association of political parties.30
The Court reiterated some general principles governing the
area of political activity and pluralist democracy.31 Political
parties in democratic societies have “an essential role in ensuring
pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy.”32
Democracy is evidently a fundamental feature of the European
public order, and there can be no democracy without
pluralism.33 In the Court’s jurisprudence, freedom of expression
is found applicable “not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are
favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.”34
Notwithstanding “its autonomous role and particular sphere of
application,” Article 11 must also be interpreted in light of
Article 10.35 As put forward by the Court, the reason behind the
link between the two freedoms is the fact that the activities of
political parties form part of a collective exercise of freedom of
expression.36
Further elaborations on the concept of democracy made the
Court consider one of the principal characteristics of democracy,
29. See id. at 19. Article 11 of the ECHR states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions
for the protection of his interests.
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than
such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of
the police or of the administration of the State.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 11.
30. United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 22.
31. See id. at 17, 18, 20–22.
32. Id. at 20.
33. See id. at 20–21.
34. Id. at 21.
35. See id. at 20; see also European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, art.
10.
36. See United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20–21.
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namely the possibility it offers to a state to solve problems
through dialogue even when the problems are irksome.37 From
here the Court concluded that “there could be no justification
for hindering a political group solely because it seeks to debate in
public [the problems] of part of the State’s population and to
take part in the nation’s political life in order to find . . .
solutions [to them].”38 Therefore, the dissolution of a political
party that seeks to open a political debate, regardless of whether
it challenges the state ideology and structure, is a drastic measure
in a pluralist democracy.
By 2005, the ECtHR had dealt with seven more cases where
the applicant parties had discussed possible solutions to Turkey’s
Kurdish issue at the domestic level and were therefore dissolved
by the Turkish Constitutional Court.39 In all of them, the Court
found a violation of the Convention rights.40
In 2005, a Macedonian minority group in Bulgaria sought
remedy in Strasbourg.41 The UMO Ilinden-PIRIN, a political
party founded on February 28, 1998 and based in southwestern
Bulgaria (in an area known as the “Pirin region” or “the
geographic region of Pirin Macedonia”), was declared
37. See id. at 27.
38. Id. at 57. Although the Court in this case tries to stress the importance of
democracy in the Convention regime, no legal definition is given to the political
concept of “democracy” in the case law. See generally id.
39. See, e.g., Emek Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 39434/98, ¶¶ 8, 14 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
May
31,
2005),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=39434/98&sessionid=
59748173&skin=hudoc-en; Democracy and Change Party v. Turkey, App. Nos. 39210/98
& 39974/98, ¶¶ 7–12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 26, 2005), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=39974/98&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en; Socialist Party of
Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 26482/95, ¶¶ 31–35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 12, 2003); Dicle for
the Democratic Party of Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 25141/94, ¶¶ 37–42 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp? item=
1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=25141/94&sessionid=59747964&skin=hudocen; Yazar v. Turkey, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 395, 402–04; Freedom and Democracy Party v.
Turkey, 1999-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 293, 301–02; Socialist Party v. Turkey, 1998-III Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1233, 1238, 1240–41, 1245.
40. See, e.g., Emek Partisi, App. No. 39434/98, ¶¶ 29–30; Democracy and Change
Party, App. Nos. 39210/98 & 39974/98, ¶¶ 26–27; Socialist Party of Turkey, App. No.
26482/95, ¶¶ 50–51; Dicle for the Democractic Party of Turkey, App. No. 25141/94, ¶¶
65–66; Yazar, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 415; Freedom and Democracy Party, 1999-VIII Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 317; Socialist Party, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1239.
41. United Macedonian Org. Ilinden-PIRIN v. Bulgaria, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1119
(2005).
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unconstitutional and, as a result, was dissolved by the Bulgarian
Constitutional Court (“BCC”) on February 29, 2000.42 Although
the party was founded in 1998, it was finally registered by the
Sofia City Court on February 12, 1999 upon making necessary
changes in its constitution.43 Similar to the UCP case, after just a
short time (ten days after notice of the registration judgment was
published), sixty-one members of the Bulgarian Parliament
requested the BCC to declare the UMO Ilinden-PIRIN
unconstitutional.44
According to the members of parliament (“MPs”) who
requested that the BCC declare the party unconstitutional, the
party’s ultimate goal was an independent Macedonian state,
formed through the secession of Pirin Macedonia from
Bulgaria.45 The facts in the case were very similar to those in the
UCP case. The party had asked for full cultural, political, and
economic autonomy for the Macedonian minority; withdrawal of
Bulgarian troops from the region; establishment of a
Macedonian Orthodox Church independent of the Bulgarian
Orthodox Church; and recognition of unique folklore, culture,
traditions, and individuality of the Macedonian people.46 The
party printed a map of Macedonia featuring territories belonging
to Bulgaria and Greece and also issued a memorandum calling
the situation of Macedonians in Bulgaria as “modern-day
genocide.”47 Relying on Article 11, paragraph two of the ECHR,
the BCC ruled, “There is no doubt that an activity aimed against
the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bulgaria imperils its
national security.”48 Nevertheless, the interpretation and
application of the limitation clauses of freedom of association in
paragraph two of Article 11 by the BCC contradicts the case law
of the ECtHR. The BCC, without trying to explain the scope of
the right recognized in the first paragraph, attempted to give a
wide application to the limitation clauses listed in the second
paragraph.49
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1121, 1123.
See id. at 1121–22.
See id.
See id. at 1122.
See id. at 1124–25.
See id. at 1124.
See id. at 1127.
See id. at 1127, 1133.
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The UMO Ilinden-Pirin, like other political parties, failed
before the domestic courts and sought redress in Strasbourg by
arguing that neither its activities nor the activities of its leaders
and members suggested hostility towards a democratic form of
government, and that a State’s territorial integrity was open to
debate like any other issue of public concern unless it made any
calls for the use of violence.50 Whereas the party built its defense
in Strasbourg on the previous case law of the ECtHR, the
Bulgarian government in its defense used the same arguments
that were used by the Turkish government, which were already
found unjustifiable for a measure like the dissolution of a
political party in a pluralist democracy.
Unlike the previous cases on the dissolution of political
parties, the parties in the UMO-Ilinden Prin case did not dispute
that Article 11 is applicable to political parties.51 Therefore, the
ECtHR went on to discuss the necessity of the dissolution in a
democratic society.52 According to the Court, the BCC did not
consider whether the party’s constitution and program
conformed with the constitution; rather it relied on “certain
statements and activities of the Party’s leaders and members,
both before and after the Party’s founding.”53 In this connection,
the Court stated that the incidents referred to by the BCC were
“rallies, speeches, press conferences, letters or maps, in which
members of the . . . Party or of its predecessor organizations had
stated that there existed a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and
that the Pirin region was not part of Bulgaria, and had made
certain peaceful demands in that respect.”54 In the view of the
ECtHR, elements of exaggeration and provocativeness included
in the party’s declarations and speeches of its leading members
do not automatically amount to a pressing social need in a
democracy for excluding the party from the political life through
the measure of dissolution.55
In both cases against Turkey and Bulgaria, political parties
touched upon thorny issues such as autonomy, federalism, selfdetermination, freedom of minority institutions, and suppression
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. at 1129.
See id. at 1132.
See id. at 1133–35.
Id. at 1134.
Id.
See id. at 1135.
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of the minority culture and language. However, nothing like
propagating or taking recourse to violence was found in the party
programs or in the speeches of the leading members. In these
cases, the ECtHR settled a case law which suggests that harboring
separatist views, no matter how disturbing they could be for the
state and the society in general, should be protected by the
Convention system and, consequently, by the domestic legal
systems of the contracting parties.
II. ANTI-SECULAR POLITICAL PARTIES
The European Court of Human Rights has dealt with two
dissolution cases concerning anti-secular political parties. Both
cases, submitted from Turkey, required the Court to elaborate
further on the limitations of political parties under the ECHR.
The first applicant was the Welfare Party (“WP”), which was
founded on July 19, 1983.56 The WP took part in a number of
elections between 1983 and 1996.57 In the general elections held
on December 24, 1995, the Party managed to secure twenty-two
percent of the votes, which made it the party with the largest
percentage of votes in the country.58 As a result of the general
elections of 1995, the Party gained 158 of the then-450 seats in
the Grand National Assembly.59 In the local elections of
November 1996, the party received about thirty-five percent of
the total votes cast.60 Whereas the WP supporters saw this victory
as a transformation towards real democracy, the secular circles
interpreted the WP’s growing political power as a revolt against
the secular character of the Turkish Republic.61
The chief prosecutor of the Republic of Turkey applied to
the Turkish Constitutional Court on May 21, 1997 for the
dissolution the WP on the grounds that the Party had become
the center of activities against the republican principle of
secularism.62 The TCC ordered the dissolution of the WP on

56. Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 269, 275 (2003).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. For further details, see M. Hakan Yavuz, Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah)
Party in Turkey, 30 COMP. POL. 63, 76 (1997).
62. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 276.
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January 16, 1998,63 when the party had been ruling the country in
a coalition government with a center-right party for eighteen
months.64 This case has been the most important one in
comparison to the previous dissolution cases decided by the TCC
because it involved a ruling party; even those constitutional
scholars who are not associated with holding liberal views stated
that the dissolution process against a ruling party is
unthinkable.65
In its case before the ECtHR, Turkey used acts, facilities, and
speeches of the Party’s representatives as pieces of evidence to
prove the WP’s anti-secular nature:
1. The WP’s leaders condoned violence in order to set up a
theocratic regime. The leader of the WP made the following
speech on April 13, 1994, to the party group in the Parliament:
The second important point is this: Refah [the WP] will
come to power and a just [social] order [adil dozen] will be
established. The question we must ask ourselves is whether
this change will be violent or peaceful; whether it will entail
bloodshed. I would have preferred not to have to use those
terms, but in the face of all that, in the face of terrorism, and
so that everyone can see the true situation clearly, I feel
obliged to do so. Today Turkey must take a decision. The
Welfare Party will establish a just order, that is certain. [But]
will the transition be peaceful or violent; will it be achieved
harmoniously or by bloodshed? The sixty million [citizens]
must make up their minds on that point.66

An MP of the WP addressed to the public: “If you attempt to
close down the ‘İmam-Hatip’ theological colleges while the
Welfare Party is in government, blood will flow. It would be worse
than in Algeria. I too would like blood to flow.”67
2. The WP promoted Sharia. One of the MPs of the WP
made the following speeches in public meetings: “[T]he army
says: ‘We can accept it if you’re a supporter of the PKK, but a
63. See id. at 279.
64. See id. at 275–76.
65. See Erdoğan Teziç, Siyasi Partiler Yasasi Tartişma Toplantilari Dizisi [Seminar on
the Law on Political Parties] 50 (TüSİAD, May 1997).
66. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 282 (quoting Mr. Necmettin Erbakan,
Welfare Party chairman).
67. See id. at 284 (quoting Mr. Ibrahim Halil Celik, Welfare Party MP for the
province of Şanlıurfa).
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supporter of sharia, never.’ Well you won’t solve the problem
with that attitude. If you want the solution, it’s sharia.”68
Another stated:
Have you considered to what extent the Koran is applied in
this country? I have done the sums. Only 39% [of the rules]
in the Koran are applied in this country. Six thousand five
hundred verses have been quietly forgotten. . . . Allah asked
all His prophets to fight for power. . . . I tell you, if I had as
many heads as I have hairs on my head, even if each of those
heads were to be torn from my shoulders for following the
way of the Koran, I would not abandon my cause. . . . The
question Allah will ask you is this: ‘Why, in the time of the
blasphemous regime, did you not work for the construction
of an Islamic State?’ Erbakan and his friends want to bring
Islam to this country in the form of a political party. The
prosecutor understood that clearly.69

3. The WP suggested establishing a multiplicity of legal
systems, which, according to the TCC, led to discrimination
based on religious beliefs.70 The leader of the WP, on March 23,
1993, made the following speech to the National Assembly:
“[Y]ou shall live in a manner compatible with your beliefs.”
We want despotism to be abolished. There must be several
legal systems. The citizen must be able to choose for himself
which legal system is most appropriate for him, within a
framework of general principles. Moreover, that has always
been the case throughout our history. In our history there
have been various religious movements. Everyone lived
according to the legal rules of his own organisation, and so
everyone lived in peace. Why, then, should I be obliged to
live according to another’s rules? . . . The right to choose
one’s own legal system is an integral part of the freedom of
religion.71
68. See id. at 283 (quoting Mr. Hassan Huseyin Ceylan, Welfare Party MP for the
province of Ankara).
69. See id. at 282–83 (quoting Mr. Sevki Yilmaz, Welfare Party MP for the province
of Rize).
70. See id. at 280–82.
71. See id. at 281 (quoting WP Chairman Necmettin Erbakan). Erbakan also said:
The plurality of legal systems advocated by Mr Necmettin Erbakan in his
speeches had its origin in the practice introduced in the first years of Islam by
the “Medina Agreement,” which had given religious minorities—the Jewish
and polytheistic communities—the right to live according to their own legal
systems, not according to Islamic law. On the basis of the Medina Agreement,
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The TCC stated it would undermine the legislative and judicial
unity in the country if each religious movement was allowed to
declare and apply the law they chose in their civil matters.72
4. The WP promoted the Islamic headscarf. In his speech of
December 14, 1995, before the general election, the WP’s leader
said in public, “[University] chancellors are going to retreat
before the headscarf when Refah [the WP] comes to power.”73
5. The WP prime minster, during the coalition government,
entertained leaders of some religious sects who attended in their
religious vestments, in the secular area of the PM’s official
residence, which is understood as assuring them state support of
the freedom to wear religious garb.
6. During the government of the WP, regulations were bent
to allow special working hours in public settings to accommodate
the devout fasting during the holy month of Ramadan.
7. The rhetoric and actions of the WP leaders led the
Turkish state to identify the party as a center for activities to
disintegrate the state.74
some Islamist intellectuals and politicians had proposed a model of peaceful
social co-existence under which each religious group would be free to choose
its own legal system.
Id. A similar system, known as the Millet system (which may be called “cultural
autonomy” with today’s terms), was applied in Ottoman Turkey for non-Muslim
communities. Id. For further information on the Ottoman Millet system, see
PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 29
(1991).
72. Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 281–82.
73. See id. at 281 (quoting WP Chairman Necmettin Erbakan). Upon an application
submitted by a university student who had been refused access to education by the
university administration for wearing the Islamic headscarf, the ECtHR had an
opportunity to deal with the problem of the prohibition of veiling for female university
students in Turkey. See generally Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175 (2005). The
ECtHR, like the highest domestic court in Turkey, found neither a violation of religious
rights and freedoms nor a violation of the right to education. See id.; see also Jill Marshall,
Conditions for Freedom? European Human Rights Law and the Islamic Headscarf Debate, 30
HUM. RTS. Q. 631, 633 n.5 (2008).
74. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 279–86. In addition to the above
speeches made by representatives of the Welfare Party, both the Turkish Constitutional
Court and the European Court of Human Rights gave unnecessary importance to some
statements of the WP’s MPs that do not have much meaning and logic. See, e.g., id. at 284
(“If they piss into the wind they’ll get their faces wet. If anyone attacks me I will strike
back. I will fight to the end to introduce sharia.” (quoting Mr. Ibrahim Halil Celik,
Welfare Party MP for the province of Sanhurfa)); id. at 285 (“A State without television
is not a State. If today, with your leadership, you wished to create a State, if you wanted
to set up a television station, you would not even be able to broadcast for more than
twenty-four hours. Do you believe it is as easy as that to create a State? That’s what I told
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The ECtHR evaluated the alleged anti-secular activities in
the following manner: First, the Court interpreted the argument
that the WP’s policy to set up a plurality of legal systems led to
discrimination based on religious beliefs and undermined the
legal and judicial unity in Turkey.75 The ECtHR took the view
that such a societal model based on a plurality of legal systems
cannot be considered compatible with the Convention system for
two reasons76: (1) the system would exclude the state’s role as the
guarantor of individual rights and freedoms “since it would
oblige individuals to obey, not rules laid down by the State in the
exercise of its above-mentioned functions, but static rules of law
imposed by the religion concerned,”77 and (2) such a system
“would undeniably infringe the principle of non-discrimination
between individuals as regards their enjoyment of public
freedoms, which is one of the fundamental principles of
democracy.”78
Next, the ECtHR commented on the place of Sharia under
the Convention regime.79 The ECtHR made it very clear that a
propagation of Sharia by a political party has no room under
European human rights protection:
Like the Constitutional Court, the Court considers that
sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules
laid down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such
as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution
of public freedoms have no place in it. The Court notes that,
when read together, the offending statements, which contain
explicit references to the introduction of sharia, are difficult
to reconcile with the fundamental principles of democracy,
as conceived in the Convention taken as a whole. It is
difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human
rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on
sharia, which clearly diverges from Convention values,
particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal
procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way
them ten years ago. I remember it now. Because today people who have beliefs, an
audience and a certain vision of the world, have a television station of their own, thanks
be to God. It is a great event.” (quoting Mr. Necmettin Erbakan)).
75. See id. at 309–10.
76. See id. at 310.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 310–12.
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it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in
accordance with religious precepts. . . . In the Court’s view, a
political party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing
sharia in a State party to the Convention can hardly be
regarded as an association complying with the democratic
ideal that underlies the whole of the Convention.80

Third, the Court evaluated the possibility of recourse to
violence as a political method by the WP members.81 One of the
main arguments of the WP’s representatives before the ECtHR
was the fact that recourse to violence had never been the party’s
method of reaching its aims. To substantiate their argument, the
WP’s representatives referred to the party program, which has no
references to such means. In fact, in addition to the party
program, no other public documents of the party nor the
election manifesto advocated violence or Sharia. Like the TCC,
the ECtHR simply disregarded these facts and demonstrated a
skeptical approach by indicating that religious fundamentalists
have been able to seize political power in certain states and have
had the opportunity to set up the model Islamic society.82
As an additional penalty, the Constitutional Court also
stripped six leading WP members, whose words and deeds had
caused the party’s dissolution, of their membership in the
Parliament.83 They were also banned for a period of five years
from becoming founding members, ordinary members, leaders,
administrators, or auditors of any other political party in
Turkey.84
This author does not feel as competent as the ECtHR to
comment on what Sharia is about, but it could be reminded that
there are controversies, disagreements, and extremely conflicting
views about Sharia. Further, Kevin Boyle points out the risk that
the hostile formulations of Islam employed by the ECtHR will
neither promote understanding nor help to distinguish between

80. See id. at 312. Yigal Mersel suggests that courts, including the ECtHR, should
not only ban political parties that are non-democratic externally, but should also
consider the lack of internal democracy as a major factor in party dissolution. See Yigal
Mersel, The Dissolution of Political Parties: The Problem of Internal Democracy, 4 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 84 (2006).
81. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 314–15.
82. See id. at 312.
83. See id. at 286.
84. See id.
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the interpretation of Islam by extremists and the beliefs of the
millions of moderate Muslims. Doing so has become much more
important since 9/11, due to the increase in prejudice against
Islam in Europe.85 In addition, it should not be the role of courts,
especially a human rights court, to supply information about
religion regardless of whether it is positive or negative.
With the case of the WP, the ECtHR, a supranational human
rights monitoring organ, approved the dissolution of a political
party for the first time in the history of human rights. The case
took its place in the list of key judgments of the ECtHR. It
provoked serious discussions on the limitations of political
parties in pluralist democracies. Whether the Court is fully
convinced that pluralist democracy and rule of law could only
have been protected with the approval of the dissolution of the
Welfare Party still remains an unanswered question. At the
theoretical level, the Court ruled that a political party that fails to
respect the principle of secularism will not enjoy religious
freedoms.86 In this conjunction, Koçak and Örücü argued that
the remarks of the TCC on secularism have had an impact on the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.87 Nonetheless, it was interesting to
see how the ECtHR distanced itself from the issue of whether the
Welfare Party posed a real threat to secularism, democracy, rule
of law, and human rights in Turkey.
Although the ECtHR justified an absolute ban on the WP,
one could simply argue that the timing of the prosecution in
Turkey to move on the Welfare case was too early to warrant
action, since it was mainly the party leader’s rhetoric rather than
explicit actions of the party that prompted the case. Even the
Turkish government before the ECtHR accepted that the party
had never exercised power alone and therefore never had an
opportunity to put into practice its plan of setting up a theocratic
state. Only if the WP had been the sole party in power could it
have been capable of implementing its policies and put an end to
democracy. However, regardless of whether a state is run by a
non-secular party like the WP, the state’s responsibility under
85. See Kevin Boyle, Human Rights, Religion and Democracy: The Refah Party Case, 1
ESSEX HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 13–14 (2004).
86. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 302.
87. Mustafa Koçak & Esin Örücü, Dissolution of Political Parties in the Name of
Democracy: Cases from Turkey and the European Court of Human Rights, 9 PUB. L. 399, 423
(2003).
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international human rights law would end only if the state
concerned withdraws from the Convention system88 or ceases to
be a member of an international organization, such as Council of
Europe. Regardless of whether the application of the religious
rules contradicts human rights norms, the state should take the
initiative and apply secular norms.
For the ECtHR, national authorities are in a better position
to decide the appropriate timing for interference, and state
parties do not need to wait until the political party comes to
power to embark on an action to destroy democracy and peace
by tabling bills at the parliament.89 The justifications of the
ECtHR to uphold the dissolution feeds the idea that the system
of Sharia was so close to being implemented that the TCC, by
acting just in time, saved the secular democracy in Turkey. Boyle,
on the other hand, who seems much more knowledgeable than
the ECtHR about the political and legal system of Turkey, deems
this picture unrealistic and adds that the Justice and
Development Party, the successor to the WP, made more efforts
toward democratic progress than any of the secular parties which
have held power in the country.90
Where the Court stressed in United Communist Party v. Turkey
that “[i]n determining whether a necessity within the meaning of
Article 11 § 2 exists, the Contracting States have only a limited
margin of appreciation,” it granted a wide margin of
appreciation to Turkish authorities when deciding the level of
the threat posed by the party to the democratic political life in
Turkey.91 One could call the wide margin of appreciation
provided to Turkish authorities in this case a protection of local

88. State parties to the ECHR, for instance, have a right to withdraw under Article
58. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 58. This is not to say
that a state’s human rights obligations would cease entirely if it did withdraw. It would
still be obliged to respect those human rights recognized by customary international law
(“CIL”); however, whether any of the political rights discussed in this Article are in fact
protected by CIL remains an open question.
89. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 298, 304, 305, 307.
90. See Boyle, supra note 85, at 12.
91. See United Communist Party v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 22 (1998).
Referring to ECtHR’s previous case law, namely the Welfare Party judgment, the
Bulgarian government in the UMO Ilinden-Pirin case indicated that states enjoy a wide
margin of appreciation in choosing the means to restrict the freedom of association. See
United Macedonian Org. Ilinden-PIRIN v. Bulgaria, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1119, 1131
(2005).
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jurisdiction, or in other words, multiculturalism. However, given
the circumstances of the case, the Court settled on cultural
singularism in an age of multiculturalism. As Scheinin argues:
Instead of excluding, as a matter of principle, the
diversification of rights and obligations in a multicultural
society according to religious affiliation and through the
delegation of certain regulatory authority to religious
entities, a human rights approach should look at the
concrete modalities and safeguards of such delegation. If a
political party declares as its aim to change legislation,
through democratic means, so that room would be given to
religious law, this should be seen as an opening for a
discussion where human rights certainly have a role to play
in designing the limits and safeguards necessitated by such
delegation of authority. But to declare that such a proposal
already makes the party program in question incompatible
with human rights goes, in the view of the present author,
too far and might leave too little room for multiculturality.92

The WP representatives asked before both the TCC and the
ECtHR to apply the “clear and present danger” test developed by
the US Supreme Court, but neither of the courts found it
necessary to apply.93 The ECtHR insisted on the “clear and
imminent danger” criteria as developed in its own case law.94
According to the ECtHR, state parties are under a positive
obligation to secure the rights and freedoms listed in the
Convention to persons under its jurisdiction.95 To this end, state
parties are empowered with the power of “preventive
intervention,” which totally rejects the “present danger” test of
the US Supreme Court.96
The dissolution of the WP was unanimously upheld by the
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR.97 However, in the previous
chamber judgment, three out of seven judges submitted a

92. Martin Scheinin, How to Resolve Conflicts Between Individual and Collective Rights?,
in RETHINKING NON-DISCRIMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 219, 230 (Martin Scheinin
& Reetta Toivanen eds., 2004).
93. See Welfare Party, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 277, 306.
94. See id. at 305–06.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 277, 305–06.
97. See id. at 316.
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dissenting opinion.98 They did not deduce from the evidence that
the WP’s actions justified the dissolution. In their joint dissenting
opinion, which is almost as long as the majority opinion, they
argued, inter alia, that many speeches of the WP representatives
in question were made long before the party came to power and,
therefore, afforded no proper basis for the dissolution.99 Other
actions when the Party was in power cannot be considered an
imminent threat to the secular system in Turkey since the party
was bound with the program of the coalition government.100
Therefore, the party did not attempt to implement a non-secular
system, nor did it take any steps to realize political aims that were
incompatible with the Convention norms, nor engage in acts of
violence or religious hatred, nor in any other manner threaten
the legal and democratic order.101 They remarked that in this
case a blunt measure of dissolving a party was taken as an
alternative to penalization of responsible individuals.102
When the dissolution case was pending before the TCC, MPs
of the Welfare Party established another political party, the
Virtue Party (“VP”), as a substitute for the Welfare Party on
December 17, 1997.103 By May 7, 1999, the Chief Prosecutor of
the Republic applied to the TCC for the dissolution of the VP as
well.104 The TCC, in its judgment delivered on June 22, 2001, had
no difficulty closing down the VP on the grounds of its activities
against the republican principle of secularism.105 The VP was
dissolved mainly because its members supported the wearing of
the Islamic headscarf at public institutions, including universities
and the Turkish Parliament. The VP had, in fact, nominated a
female candidate wearing a headscarf, who was elected in 1999,
98. Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v. Turkey, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 92 (2002)
(Fuhrmann, J., Loucaides, J., & Bratza, Sir Nicolas J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 98.
100. See id. at 97.
101. See id. at 94, 97–98.
102. Id.; see Boyle, supra note 85, at 11 (arguing that statements made a number of
years before the party came to power were classified as meeting an immediate danger for
the implementation of such a policy). See generally LOUKIS LOUCAIDES, AN ALTERNATIVE
VIEW ON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A
COLLECTION OF SEPARATE OPINIONS (1998–2007) 299–313 (Françoise Tulkens et al.
eds., 2008).
103. See REGISTRY, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INFORMATION NOTE NO.
76 ON THE CASE-LAW OF THE COURT 25.
104. See id.
105. See id.
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entered into Parliament, and swore the oath with her headscarf
on.106
Unlike the WP, the VP did not have any chances of gaining
enough votes to come to power. None of its members used
language referring to Sharia, the jihad (holy war), or violence.
The party members declared no support for plurality of legal
systems or any other form of religious rules. Bearing all this
information in mind, the VP leaders were confident about a
favorable ruling from Strasbourg when they submitted their
application to the ECtHR against Turkey. The ECtHR found the
application admissible;107 it even held a hearing in Strasbourg at
the Human Rights Palace of the Council of Europe.108 However,
representatives of the Virtue Party lost their faith in the ECtHR.
Hence, less than two months after the hearing took place, they
sent a declaration to the Court for the withdrawal of the case.109
In their declaration, the VP representatives argued that
European human rights protection is closed to believers of
Islam.110 Basing their arguments on the previous cases decided by
the ECtHR, they expressed that the hypothetical interpretations
and the practice of the Court in cases such as the WP dissolution
case and the headscarf case111 constitute a contradiction and a
double standard, which is a violation of the prohibition of
discrimination by the Court itself.112 Having concluded that the
Court was prejudiced against Muslim applicants, they decided to
withdraw the case.113 Pursuant to the withdrawal, the ECtHR
decided on April 27, 2006, to strike the case from its docket.114
This withdrawal relieved the ECtHR of the task of applying its
previous restrictive remarks on Islam and anti-secularism to a

106. See Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Chamber Hearing:
Kavakci v. Turkey, Fazilet Partisi and Kutan v. Turkey, Silay v. Turkey, and Ilicak v.
Turkey (Apr. 5, 2007) (on file with author).
107. Virtue Party, App. No. 1444/02, ¶ 6 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 27, 2006), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=
html&highlight=1444/02&sessionid=59748173&skin=hudoc-en.
108. Id. ¶ 7.
109. Id. ¶ 9.
110. See id.
111. Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175 (2005).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 176.
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party that only asked for the freedom to let female university
students and public servants wear a veil.
In many other cases submitted to the ECtHR concerning the
political activities of political parties, the Court stressed the
importance of recourse to violence and a respect for Convention
rights when designating limits for political parties.115 For the
Court, the protection of opinions and the freedom to express
them is one of the objectives of the freedoms of assembly and
association enshrined in Article 11.116 That applies all the more
in relation to political parties in view of their essential role in
ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy.117
The Court further ruled:
In any event, the Court cannot find any statements . . .
despite the critical and sometimes hostile language used,
that might reasonably be construed as a call for the use of
violence for political ends or as a policy in breach of the
rules of democracy. In this connection, the Court observes
that . . . [the] applicant stated that he was in favor of free,
multi-party elections and a political system based on respect
for others and their political opinions . . . .118

III. POLITICAL PARTIES WITH LINKS TO A TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION
The year 2009 marked another turning point in the history
of human rights in Europe. The world had already experienced
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent bombings in
Bali, Istanbul, London, and Madrid. In the instant case of Herri
Batasuna v. Spain, the ECtHR dealt with an application of a
political party that was dissolved after having been found guilty of
supporting terrorism.119
The Herri Batasuna, an electoral coalition, and the
Batasuna, a political party, were founded on March 1, 1979, and
115. See, e.g., Partidul Comunistilor v. Romania, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 209, 220
(2005); Yazar v. Turkey, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 395, 412 (2002).
116. See Partidul Comunistilor v. Romania, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 219–20.
117. See id. at 220.
118. Id. at 222.
119. See generally Herri Batasuna v. Spain, App. Nos. 25803/04 & 25817/04 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. June 30, 2009), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=25817/04&sessionid=59748173
&skin=hudoc-en.
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May 3, 2001, respectively, in Spain as the political wing of Euskadi
Ta Askatasuna (“ETA”), the Basque separatist organization.120
Following the Spanish Parliament’s newly enacted Law on
Political Parties (“LOPP”),121 Spain’s Attorney General submitted
a case to the Spanish Supreme Court (“SSC”) on September 2,
2002, for the dissolution of the applicant parties.122 The aim of
LOPP was to set out the limitations on political parties when they
violate rights of citizens by promoting racism or violence. The
Spanish Parliament prepared the new regulations regarding
political parties because of the relationship between ETA and
Herri Batasuna and Batasuna. According to the key provision of
Article 9 of LOPP, political parties could be declared illegal when
they repeatedly: (1) violate fundamental rights by promoting,
justifying, or excusing attacks on the life or dignity of the person
or the exclusion or persecution of an individual by reason of
ideology, religion, beliefs, nationality, race, sex, or sexual
orientation; (2) encourage or enable violence to be used as a
means to achieve political ends or as a means to undermine the
conditions that make political pluralism possible; or (3) assist
and give political support to terrorist organizations with the aim
of subverting the constitutional order.123
In applying LOPP, the SSC declared the applicant parties
illegal and ordered their dissolution on the basis of LOPP on
March 12, 2003.124 The crux of the Supreme Court’s decision was
the fact that the applicant parties had strong links with the
terrorist organization ETA, which put the Batasuna and Herri
Batasuna under ETA control.125 In other words, the applicant
parties were working as a satellite organization of the ETA. The
Supreme Court based its decision on a number of activities

120. See id. ¶¶ 9, 16.
121. Law on Political Parties art. IX (B.O.E. 2002, 6) (Spain).
122. See id. ¶ 28.
123. Id. Paragraph three of Article 9 of the Law on Political Parties (“LOPP”) also
lists different types of conduct in detail that, when repeated, comprise the conditions set
forth in the previous paragraph. See id.; see also, Katherine A. Sawyer, Comment, Rejection
of Weimarian Politics or Betrayal of Democracy?: Spain’s Proscription of Batasuna Under the
European Convention on Human Rights, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1531, 1546, 1551 (2003); Leslie
Turano, Spain: Banning Political Parties as a Response to Basque Terrorism, 1 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 730, 733 (2003).
124. See Herri Batasuna, App. Nos. 25803/04 & 25817/04, ¶ 30.
125. See id. ¶¶ 30, 32.
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carried out by the representatives of the applicant parties.126
These activities were found to be instruments for the separatist
strategy of the terrorist ETA.127 Two appeals submitted to the
Spanish Constitutional Court against the decisions of the SSC
were unanimously rejected by the Constitutional Court on
January 16, 2004.128
On July 7, 2002, Batasuna’s representative stated in public
that the party would continue to work and fight legally or
illegally.129 He also added that their “arms do not tremble
because they are in a historical moment where nothing could
force them to abandon their struggle.”130 During a
demonstration on August 11, 2002, called by Batasuna to support
ETA prisoners, party leaders were heard shouting slogans such as
“the struggle is the only way,” “you, the fascists, you are the real
terrorists,” and “live military ETA.”131 In another press
conference held by the Batasuna on August 21, 2002, the
spokesperson criticized the “genocidal strategy of the Spanish
state” and declared that the Basque people would “organize” and
“fight.”132 In an interview with a newspaper on August 23, 2002,
another representative of the Batasuna in the Basque Parliament
declared ETA an organization that sees the need to use all
instruments to deal with the state.133 The SSC also underlined the
fact that in the municipalities run by the Batasuna and on the
web page of the party, anagrams of an illegal organization was
posted.134 On many occasions these municipalities incited people
to fight against the state, state representatives, and other political
parties. In addition, in many other public meetings,
representatives, mayors, and leading members of the applicant
parties declared implicitly or explicitly their support to ETA
terrorists.135

126. See id. ¶ 34.
127. See id. ¶ 35.
128. See id. ¶¶ 44–46. By a decision dated March 12, 2003, the Spanish
Constitutional Court had already found the new LOPP constitutional. See id. ¶ 20.
129. See id. ¶ 34.
130. See id. (author’s translation from French).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. For further activities of the applicant parties, see id.
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Like other political parties dissolved by national courts,
Herri Batasuna and Batasuna brought their case to the ECtHR.136
For the representatives of the dissolved political parties, whatever
action taken by the parties in the political arena should be seen
as manifestations of freedom of expression. The legal problem
for the applicants was the fact that their expressions were not
shared by the state and were therefore interpreted subjectively by
the domestic courts. For them, the facts attributed to the parties
did not justify a severe measure of dissolution.137
In opposition to the applicants’ claims that the activities
should be analyzed under freedom of expression, the ECtHR
followed its previous case law on the topic, which suggests that
the means used to limit rights and freedoms should be legal (i.e.,
proportional and necessary) and comply with fundamental
democratic principles.138 Sharing the opinions of the domestic
courts, the ECtHR considered the parties’ links with the terrorist
organization as a threat to democracy. This led the Court to
decide that the sanction imposed on the applicants was in
balance with the reason for interference and met a pressing
social need, and was therefore necessary in a democratic
society.139
The applicant parties’ links to the ETA were not unknown to
political and legal circles in Spain, Europe, and elsewhere. The
question was whether democracies should deal with the
expressions listed above individually on the bases of criminal law
or whether affiliated institutions should also be subjected to the
legal process for dissolution. Interpretations of the ECtHR
decision in Welfare Party v. Turkey encouraged legal actions
against political parties whose representatives actively supported
the violent acts of illegal organizations.140 The SCC found that
the calls to and support for violence by the representatives of the
Batasuna were more explicit than those by the WP
representatives.141
The Batasuna judgment of the ECtHR encouraged the TCC
to pursue the dissolution of the Kurdish political party, the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. ¶ 1.
See id. ¶¶ 67–68.
See id. ¶¶ 74, 76–77, 79.
See id. ¶¶ 89, 92–94.
See id. ¶¶ 38, 67 (discussing Welfare Party).
See id.
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Democratic Society Party (“DSP”).142 In addition to classic
arguments used in previous cases in which the party campaigned
for minority rights, the Chief Prosecutor of the Republic accused
the party of tolerating and not condemning the violent activities
of the PKK (a Kurdish armed group placed in the lists of terrorist
organizations by the European Union and the United States),
encouraging their perpetrators, and directly and indirectly
supporting the organization.143 Unlike, the SSC, the TCC did not
differentiate the speeches of the party members that could be
considered as supporting violence from those expressions only
endorsing the political views of the PKK.144 Following the
dissolution of the party by the TCC in December 2009,145 the
DSP’s representatives filed a case with the Strasbourg Court,146
which will give the ECtHR a second chance to further elaborate
on the limits of political parties that have established links with
terrorist groups under European human rights law.
CONCLUSION
The strict legal regulations in Turkey regarding political
party dissolution make the country a unique one in Europe.
Unfortunately, Turkey’s legislation on political parties resembles
anti-terrorism legislation. The military junta of 1980–1983, as the
author of the existing law on political parties, designed it in
response to the question of how to make political parties adhere
to the 1982 Constitution, which was partly prepared by the junta
to oppress any non-Turkish nationalist movements. Therefore,
instead of securing a free space in which political parties could
enjoy political rights, the law set out comprehensive limitations
on parties in order to not allow them to challenge state ideology
as enshrined in the constitution.

142. See Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey] Dec.
31, 2009, E. 2007/1, Official Gazette No. 27449.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. DTP AİHM’e başvurdu [DTP Appelas to the ECtHR], TURKEY RADIO &
TELEVISION CORP., Jan. 20, 2010, http://www.trt.net.tr/haber/HaberDetay.aspx?
HaberKodu=9323d5c5-fe57-4c60-a20a-54f999853178.

2010]

DISSOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

71

Between 1968 and 2009, the Turkish Constitutional Court
closed down twenty-five political parties in Turkey.147 More than
half of these cases were brought before the TCC from the 1990s
onwards.148 It is well developed in the country’s political and legal
culture that the dissolution of political parties serves best to
suppress political ideas that challenge state ideology. Due to the
high number of parties faced with the dissolution process, the
domestic case law is often referred to as a “cemetery for political
parties.”149 Representatives of the dissolved parties filed eleven
applications to the European Court of Human Rights. In only
one of the cases, Welfare Party, did the ECtHR side with the state.
The WP’s liberal successor, the ruling Justice and
Development Party, also faced the dissolution process as late as
2008.150 Despite the fact that the party was very careful to carry
out activities without using religious rhetoric and thus preferred
to be named conservative democrats, the TCC declared the
party’s activities unconstitutional on the grounds that the party
engaged in activities against the secularism principle of the
Republic.151 Instead of a permanent dissolution, the TCC
ordered a one year deprivation of state aid as a penalty.152 This
non-dissolution conclusion arrived after the Turkish Parliament,
within the 2001 EU harmonization package, amended relevant
articles in the constitution to give the TCC an opportunity to
decide on an alternative penalty instead of permanently
dissolving the political party.153 Another threshold that was
introduced in this package was that the voting rules of the TCC
were changed, introducing the requirement of a three-fifths
qualified majority (seven out of eleven judges) for dissolution of
147. See Murat Sevinç, DTP’nin Kaptilmasi [Closing Down the DSP], RADIKAL IKI,
Nov. 25, 2007, http://www.radikal.com.tr/ed_haber.php?ek=r2&haberno=7695.
148. See Edip Yuksel, Cannibal Democracies, Theocratic Secularism: The Turkish Version,
7 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 444–45 (1999).
149. See, e.g., Press Release, Union of European Turkish Democrats, Decision of the
Turkish Constitutional Court to Not Outlaw the AKP, July 31, 2008, http://www.uetdbrussels.eu/2008/07/31/decision-of-the-turkish-constitutional-court-to-not-outlaw-theakp-press-release-from-the-uetd-brussels/?lang=en&lang=en; Hilmi Toros, Turkey Ready
for Another Political Burial, ASIA TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
Middle_East/IL11Ak06.html.
150. See Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey], July
30, 2008, No. 27034, 24.10.2008.
151. Id. § VI.
152. Id. § VII.A.
153. See Opinion on Turkey, supra note 5, at 16.
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a political party.154 In the Justice and Development Party case,
only six judges voted for the dissolution; one vote saved the
Party’s political life.155 The fascinating aspect of the outcome of
this case is that Turkey’s strongest political party, which received
more than forty-six percent of the votes cast in general elections
held in July 2007 and has been ruling the country since 2002, was
found unconstitutional by the TCC.156 Yet, the Party is in power
but still in constitutional limbo. In addition, it was only in late
December 2009 that the TCC dissolved the Kurdish political
party, the Democratic Society Party.157
In fact, the aim and the provisions on the limitations of the
Turkish law on political parties have not changed. The change in
2001 was made in the voting rules of the TCC, which asked a
qualified majority to decide on dissolution, and a new alternative
penalty—deprivation of state aid—was also introduced. However,
the list of material limitations on political parties is still so long
that the Constitutional Court may dissolve any party that
challenges the state ideology on minorities and secularism. Due
to the fact that the legislation literally falls short of European
human rights standards, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe in its regulations and the Commission of the
European Union in its annual progress reports on Turkey’s EU
membership constantly calls on Turkey to make changes in its
domestic law with an aim to limit the possibility of applying such
extreme a measure as dissolution.
Unlike the Turkish legislation, Bulgaria’s new legislation on
political parties was found clear, straightforward, modern, and
ambitious by the Venice Commission.158 Regarding political party
dissolution, the commission criticized the legislation only on two
procedural points: First, the law empowers both the
Constitutional Court and the Sofia City Court to dissolve a
political party. Second, public prosecutors are the only persons
154. See id. at 19.
155. See id.
156. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working
Document, Turkey 2007 Progress Report, SEC (2007) 1436, at 6.
157. See Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey] Dec.
31, 2009, Official Gazette No. 27449, E. 2007/1.
158. See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice
Commission), Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Law on Political Parties of Bulgaria 2
CDL-AD (2008) 034, ¶ 3 (Dec. 15, 2008).
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who may apply for dissolution.159 In Spain, the competent organ
for party closure is the Supreme Court, but the party concerned
has a possibility to appeal the decision of the Supreme Court to
the Constitutional Court. In Turkey and in many other European
countries the only competent organ that could rule on the
dissolution is the constitutional court. In the view of the
Commission, in a constitutional democracy, the dissolution of a
political party should not be a matter for ordinary or
administrative courts; it should be for the constitutional court to
decide involuntary dissolution.160
On the second procedural point, the Commission observed
that the obligation to apply for the dissolution of a party should
be entrusted to an institution with political legitimacy, not to
public prosecutors.161 The reason for this view is the political
nature and consequences of a decision for dissolution. Both in
Turkey and Bulgaria, the legal competence to initiate a
dissolution case against a political party is given to public
prosecutors. In Spain, the procedure can be launched either by
the government through the state attorney, acting on its own, at
the request of one of the two chambers of the Parliament, or by
the Fiscal Ministry acting on its own.162
The cases on political party dissolutions that were analyzed
in this Article gave the Strasbourg human rights institutions—the
European Commission of Human Rights, the European Court of
Human Rights, and the Venice Commission—a significant
opportunity to further advance their views on the relationship
between the freedom of expression, thought, conscience, and
religion provided in Articles 9 and 10 of the ECHR and the
freedom of association and the freedom of assembly provided in
Article 11.
According to the dissolved political parties, the aim behind
the dissolution processes was to eliminate political expressions
and debates on sensitive issues. This was certainly the case in
Turkey concerning pro-minority political parties. However, in
Batasuna, the Spanish government successfully presented
159. See id. at 7.
160. See id.; see also Opinion on Turkey, supra note 5, at 7.
161. See Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Law on Political Parties of Bulgaria,
supra note 158, at 7.
162. Opinion on Turkey, supra note 5, at 8.
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evidence that separatist political parties do exist in the political
domain of various autonomous regions of the country and that it
was only those political parties who support violence that faced
dissolution. This view was the strongest point of the government
in the case and was fully shared by the ECtHR. In addition, in
Zana v. Turkey, where the applicant was a Kurdish intellectual
and an ex-mayor of a city run by the Kurdish minority party, the
ECtHR upheld the conviction of the applicant who, in an
interview, stated, “I support the PKK national movement; on the
other hand, I am not in favor of massacres. Anyone can make
mistakes, and the PKK kill women and children by mistake.”163
Individual expressions or statements made on behalf of the
political parties in favor of separatism have secured protection in
Strasbourg, but expressions implicitly or explicitly giving support
to violence are not tolerated under European human rights law.
Since the link with a terrorist organization was clear and not even
denied by the applicants in Batasuna,164 the ECtHR did not have
much difficulty in ruling that the party posed a threat to
democracy in Spain. The enjoyment of democratic rights and
freedoms with an “aim” to replace existing democratic order
with a non-democratic one has no protection under European
human rights law. The European human rights platform is closed
to enemies of democracy provided that they gained significant
power for the change.
It is interesting to observe in these cases that a Europeanwide human rights court may also use terms such as “secularism,”
which has totally different meanings in different parts of Europe.
While the ECtHR in the WP case deprived the political party of
human rights protection on the basis of its anti-secular activities,
in its well-established jurisprudence the ECtHR provided full
protection to the prohibition of abortion and divorce in Catholic
countries without even arguing that applying such rules that have
roots in a religion may contradict the principle of secularism.165
163. See Zana v. Turkey, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533, 2540 (1997).
164. See Herri Batasuna v. Spain, App. Nos. 25803/04 & 25817/04, ¶¶ 34–35 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. June 30, 2009), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=25817/04&sessionid=59748173
&skin=hudoc-en.
165. See Refah Partisi v. Turkey (Welfare Party), 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 269, 310–12
(2003); see also Tysiac v. Poland, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 947, 968 (2007); Johnston v. Ireland,
112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 203, 217–20 (1986).

2010]

DISSOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

75

Yet the protection provided by the ECtHR to anti-secular
views appears somewhat different from the protection provided
to separatist views. In Gündüz v. Turkey, the ECtHR gave full
protection to the anti-secular views of the applicant a leader of a
religious sect. He was convicted in Turkey for his violent criticism
of the secular regime by labeling democrats “impious,”
describing children born of marriages officiated before the
secular authorities as “bastards,” and calling for the introduction
of Sharia as a final solution.166 The ECtHR has departed from its
previous decision by arguing that the anti-secular political party,
the WP, had potential to seize power and turn against the
Convention system, but this cannot be the case for an
individual.167 This indicates that in European human rights law,
separatist views can be restricted only when they are combined
with recourse to violence while anti-secular views can be limited if
there is violent recourse or support for the institutionalization of
Sharia law. Keeping in mind that political parties have more
power over the people than they have over an individual, the
ECtHR endeavors to prevent the existence of such a pro-Sharia
power embodied in a political party, which is deemed dangerous
for the application of the Convention at the national level. Thus,
the recent judgments of the ECtHR are perhaps part of an
increasing prejudice against Islam in Europe analogous to the
fear of totalitarianism, which also framed the case law of the
1950s.
The ECtHR describes the ECHR as a constitutional
instrument of the European public order.168 This description lays
down the necessity of compliance with the Convention system.
Considering this, the ECHR together with the strong language
used by the ECtHR against anti-secular political parties, one
could still ask whether state parties to the Convention could
tolerate a political party promoting Sharia in their domestic
jurisdictions. In the view of the present author, Strasbourg
jurisdiction on this subject should be taken as minimum legal
standards but not as the ultimate normative rules. The ECtHR,

166. See Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 257, 262–64 (2003); see also Şahin
v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 224 (2005) (Tulken, J., dissenting).
167. Gündüz, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 275.
168. See Louizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 134
(1995).
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under the margin of appreciation doctrine, allowed certain
discretion to the states in deciding the appropriate time to take
action. This means that only when states deem it necessary will
they apply the ECtHR rulings. If not, as provided by Article 53
ECHR, European human rights law should not be construed as
limiting or derogating from wider protection ensured under the
domestic law of contracting parties.
Will there be more dissolution of political parties in Europe
in the near future? In its reports, the Venice Commission of the
Council of Europe determined that a large number of European
states have no regulations on party dissolution.169 Even in those
states which have comprehensive provisions on party dissolution,
the provisions are narrowly interpreted and rarely invoked.
Rather, they work as a passive safety tool.170
The dissolution processes also presented some answers to
the question of whether banning a political party could serve as a
method to combat political ideologies that challenge those held
by the state. In the case of Turkey, while the dissolution of prominority political parties simply paved the way for the birth of
more radical successors, the dissolution process faced by the antisecular parties apparently pushed those parties to the centerright wing of the political domain. Today’s Kurdish party in
Turkey, the Peace and Democracy Party (“PDP”), does not hide
its support for the PKK. In fact, the PDP was founded on the
ashes of its predecessors, the DSP. On the other hand, both the
current Justice and Development Party as well as the Happiness
Party pursue more liberal policies than their predecessors, the
WP and the VP. They are reluctant to refer to Islamic law at any
level.
As a final remark, it should be emphasized that the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR has been the driving force behind
several positive amendments in domestic legislation regarding
the limitations on political parties. However, in the view of this
author, preparatory works for possible new legislation on political
parties should also take into account the domestic legislation of
169. See Opinion on Turkey, supra note 5, at 5.
170. See generally European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice
Commission), Guidelines on Prohibition and Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogous
Measures, CDL-INF(2001)1 (Jan. 10, 2000); see also Opinion on Turkey, supra note 5, at 5–
6, 14–15.
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European democracies and the comments of the supranational
organizations, i.e., the Council of Europe, the European Union,
and the Human Rights Committee of the UN, all of which are in
some ways more liberal in their interpretations than the
European Court of Human Rights.

